I: Taking a hard look at food security: insights from the SP impasse.

Although some recent developments have temporarily revived hopes for the Doha Round, prospects remain bleak for an agreement in the near future. There is not enough multilateral will or consensus to overcome difficulties associated with the complexities of the U.S. political situation.

Meanwhile, no country wants to take the blame for stalling the multilateral negotiations. This might be because, although the current texts are far from the initial agenda proposed in 2001, the Doha Agenda is still known as the "Development Round", and many still hold hopes that it will (sometime) deliver on redressing imbalances that still prevail in the world trading system.

And yet, the persistence of the impasse on how to treat Special Products should focus developing country negotiators' minds on the inadequacy of the Doha framework when it comes to addressing development concerns. In September, discussions on Special Products (SPs) got stuck on the question of indicators: countries that dislike the concept of SPs argue their use needs to be governed by objective criteria, based on verifiable data. SP proponents, on the contrary, are concerned that this might constrain the freedom of countries to "self-designate" their special products, a principle that was agreed to at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005.

There is no simple solution to the complex challenges of protecting food security, rural development and livelihoods in all developing countries, be they net importers or net exporters of agricultural products. Ultimately, to address these fundamental issues in a trade negotiation will require strong and respected input from other multilateral agencies and government officials with the requisite expertise. If criteria are hard to determine and easy to hide behind, then WTO members must find some way of judging the criteria (and their application) by working with experts who know something about rural livelihoods and food security. This is not a task for trade lawyers alone. Were the multilateral trade agenda properly integrated into the wider multilateral system of governance such an approach would be obvious. Negotiations on how to respect rural development priorities within the framework of a trade agreement could be a place to experiment with a new approach.

IATP Geneva Update, Oct. 4, 2007

II: WTO members back at work in Geneva

Multilateral agriculture negotiations, chaired by Ambassador Falconer, resumed on September 3 and stopped for a break on September 21. In conformity with the plan laid-out by the Chair, members used the three week long negotiating period to go over all the issues outlined in the July draft modalities text. Some issues received more attention than others: the discussions on sensitive products, developed countries' domestic support and the question of the designation of Special Products (SPs) by developing countries continued to be in the spotlight.

No progress was in sight until, on September 19, with the negotiating period coming to an end, the U.S. openly accepted to work within the ranges proposed by the Chair for limiting domestic support. This meant agreeing to cap trade distorting support somewhere between US$13 - 16.4bn. Previously, the U.S. official offer was a cap of US$22bn (in an offer tabled in October 2005, and not revised since then). Negotiators knew they would likely come down from this ceiling, but still the public acceptance of Ambassador Falconer's suggested compromise range was important, even if the question of whether it will be US$16bn or $13bn remains unanswered.

The U.S. move did not come free of strings, however: in exchange, other members are expected to accept the rest of the parameters set out in the two Chair's texts, both in agriculture and in NAMA. The latter appears particularly unlikely, given the strong resistance the NAMA draft faced from a number of developing countries when it was released in July. Still, the U.S. move had some impact. Yet as multilateral negotiations paused for two weeks on September 21, it remains unclear whether the U.S. move will trigger any significant reaction from other countries.

The U.S. also played a leading role in the other major development that marked negotiations in September: the emergence of a new parallel negotiating configuration, originally known as the "group of eight" (G8). Including the U.S., E.U., Brazil, India, Australia, Japan, Argentina and Canada, the group started meeting on September 6th, at the invitation of the U.S. delegation. While members had initially downplayed its significance, portraying the group as a "forum", its importance became more obvious after their informal and secret meeting with Ambassador Falconer on Friday, September 14. From then on, genuine negotiation among the members of the group was expected to trigger progress in the multilateral process.

To many WTO members and observers this sounds all too familiar. To push an agenda that the broader membership is resisting, a small group of countries emerges to lead the charge and gets tasked with brokering a compromise. Although previous attempts in the Doha context have failed, powerful WTO members have not abandoned the strategy.

At some point though, India conditioned its continued participation to the group on the inclusion of more developing countries. China, South Africa, Jamaica and Indonesia were invited to join the G8 on September 18 and became new members of what is now called "the group of twelve" (G12). Since then, the group has held intensive negotiating sessions, occasionally inviting other countries to join on specific issues. Participants have reported a high level of engagement, very technical and in-depth discussions on numerous issues, but little concrete progress. Starting October 1, they planned to go back to try to produce technical papers to feed into the multilateral process.

It is unclear whether this will be possible. And if they do produce papers, it is unclear what new things they can say. Obviously some stakeholders hope the G12 process will make the breakthrough towards agreement on the Doha Agenda, while a number of members are frustrated that the multilateral process is again being sidelined.

071004 IATP